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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
made

errors in

summarily dismissing his claims for post-conviction relief First, he contends that
proved his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely motion to suppress,
which precluded him from moving to suppress statements Mr. Mallory made during an
interrogation after several unequivocal requests for counsel (the "Fifth Amendment"
claim). Second, Mr. Mallory contends he raised a genuine issue of material fact that the
district court deprived him of his constitutional right to due process by denying him
timely access to a private investigator, since doing so denied him access to the
materials of a defense - namely, access to a critical witness and potential alternate
perpetrator (the "private investigator" claim)

Third, Mr. Mallory he raised a genuine

issue of material fact that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not fully
litigating issues surrounding the improper presentation of evidence about scratch marks
on his body, as those scratch marks were not received until after the relevant events
(the "scratch mark" claim).
The State concedes that the district court improperly dismissed the private
investigator claim by dismissing it on a basis for which Mr. Mallory did not have notice or
opportunity to respond. The State does raises arguments in regard to some, but not all
of the aspects of Mr. Mallory's arguments on appeal. However, the issues upon which it
has remained silent actually undermine most of the arguments it did make.

1

Ultimately, none of the State's arguments are persuasive, and so, this Court

should reverse the district court's orders denying and dismissing Mr. Mallory's claims in
his petition for post-conviction relief and remand this case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Mallory's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court erred, following an evidentiary hearing, when it denied
Mr. Mallory's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely and
effectively argue the motion to suppress the video of his interrogation.

2.

Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Mallory's claim
that his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection were violated
when the district court failed to timely rule on his motion to appoint a private
investigator.

3.

Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Mallory's claim
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to '·fully litigate" a challenge to
evidence and testimony regarding the nature of the scratch marks on his person.

3

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred, Following An Evidentiary Hearing, When It Denied
Mr. Mallory's Claim That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Timely And
Effectively Argue The Motion To Suppress The Video Of His Interrogation
In regard to Mr. Mallory's Fifth Amendment claim, the State offers no rebuttal to
Mr. Mallory's argument that trial counsel was ineffective for not ensuring the district
court actually watched the video of the interrogation (see App. Br., pp.24-25), nor does
it challenge his assertion that the statement

"Get a lawyer, call my mom and dad,

[expletive deleted] that drink of water, put me in jail.
1: 15:30)

That's it." (State's Exhibit 15,

constituted the first of many unequivocal requests for counsel made by

ML Mallory during the interrogation (see App. Br., pp.16-23.)
Instead, the State argues that the timeliness of the motion to suppress is not
properly considered in these post-conviction proceedings, and so, it claims there is no
evidence rebutting the presumption that trial counsel's actions vis-a-vis the motion to
suppress were strategic. (Resp. Br., pp.15-16.) Similarly, it contends that Mr. Mallory
did not sufficiently prove the prejudice caused him by counsel's failure to provide
adequate representation in presenting the motion to suppress.

(See generally Resp.

Br., pp.16-21.) The State is incorrect on both counts.

A

The Timeliness Of The Motion To Suppress Is A Relevant Consideration In The
Fifth Amendment Claim
Mr. Mallory's allegation was that his attorney "provided ineffective assistance of

counsel by not fully litigating and presenting to the District Court evidence of statements
made by the defendant during police interrogation should be suppressed in violation of

4

petitioner's Sixth Amendment Rights.'' 1 (R., p.115.)

He specifically argued that trial

counsel should have based his argument on the fact that Mr. Mallory invoked his right to
counsel far earlier in the proceedings than the district court apparently concluded.
(R., pp.115-16 (Mr. Mallory's allegation in post-conviction); Supp. Tr., p.12, L.17-p.121,
L.20 (the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress).) Trial counsel was unable to
make an argument about the actual merits of when Mr. Mallory invoked his right as a
direct result of his failure to file the motion to suppress timely.

When a motion to

suppress is filed untimely, the courts will not consider the merits of the motion unless
the proponent shows good cause or excusable neglect for the late filing.

See, e.g.,

State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888 (1985); State v. Dice. 126 Idaho 595, 597 (Ct. App.
1994). "Allowing untimely motions to be heard because they appear meritorious," the
Dice Court held, "eviscerates the purpose of [I.C.R. 12(d)]." Dice, 126 Idaho at 597.
Thus, a trial court would abuse its discretion by considering the merits of a pretrial
motion filed late without justification. 2 Alanis, 109 Idaho at 888.
As such, trial counsel was reduced to arguing that he had just learned of the 19second gap, and that the gap must, therefore, be the point ?t which Mr. Mallory
requested counsel, (see Supp. Tr., p.81, Ls.2-18), since newly-discovered information
about the exhibit might constitute good cause. However, trial counsel was unsuccessful
in that effort. (See R., p.177 (district court in post-conviction finding, as a matter of fact,

The reference to the Sixth Amendment, as opposed to the Fifth Amendment, as the
source of the relevant right to counsel simply appears to be a typographical error.
2 The State actually contends that the district court ruled on the merits of Mr. Mallory's
motion, rather than the fact that it was untimely filed. (Resp. Br., p.15.) However, the
district court actually ruled that the argument about the 19-second gap (i.e., the
justification for the late filing) did not support the motion to suppress. (Supp. Tr., p.121,
Ls.13-20; see also R., p.177 (district court in post-conviction finding, as a matter of fact,
that the trial court did not find good cause to excuse the late filing).)
1
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that the motion was late and the trial court did not find good cause to excuse the late
filing).) That means trial counsel was preciuded from arguing, and the district court was
precluded from considering or ruling on, the actual merits of the motion to suppress.
Alanis, 109 Idaho at 888; Dice, 126 Idaho 597.

Trial counsel does not perform

reasonably when he does not timely file valid motions. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 130
Idaho 772, 794 (1997) ("we note that the failure to file a motion is considered deficient
performance by counsel if there were a reasonable probability that the motion would
have been meritorious.").
To that point, the State does not contest Mr. Mallory's contention that the first
unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel occurred at 1: 15:30 in the interview. (See
Resp. Br., p.19 (the State's only reference to that fact providing: "Even if Mallory's first
reference to a lawyer, which occurred at approximately 01: 15:34, is considered an
unambiguous invocation, by that time Mallory already made statements about his
whereabouts the prior evening, including the last time he allegedly saw Charlene.").)3
However, the prosecutor below represented that Mr. Mallory did not invoke his right to
counsel until 1:34:32.

(Supp. Tr., p.110, Ls.20-23.)

The district court apparently

accepted the prosecutor's representation. (See Supp. Tr., p.120, L. 17 - p.121, L.20.)
Since Mr. Mallory made an unequivocal request for counsel well before that time, a
properly presented motion to suppress (which would include ensuring the district court

The State's reference to the fact about when Mr. Mallory made his request for counsel
was made in the context of an argument that the portions of the video prior to that
moment might still be admissible. (See Resp. Br., p.19.) This Court does not have to
decide that issue, as there are several other reasons the remaining portion of the video
might be inadmissible. That is an issue for remand; the issue on appeal is whether the
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not properly arguing to suppress the vast
majority of statements which came after Mr. Mallory's unequivocal request for counsel
was not scrupulously honored by officers.
3
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the video which proves Mr. Mallory's argument correct)

a

being
The timeliness of the motion

a critical fact to be considered in post-

conviction, since the untimeliness prevented an argument on the actual merits of the
motion, and it was the failure to pursue the motion on the actual merits that constitutes
the claim of ineffective assistance. As such, the State's assertion on appeal - that the
timeliness of the motion to suppress is not relevant (Resp. Br., p.15) - is erroneous.

B.

There Was No Strategic Rationale Behind Trial Counsel's Failure To File A
Timely Motion, And So, Mr. Mallory Has Proved Deficient Performance
This also demonstrates the error in the State's assertion that there was some

strategic or tactical reason for trial counsel's actions vis-a-vis the motion to suppress
Mr. Mallory's statements.

The motion trial counsel filed requested the district court

suppress all the statements Mr. Mallory made during the interview. (Supp. R., p.254.)
There is no strategic reason for counsel to preclude himself from making the stronger
argument so that he might resort to making a weaker argument, and in doing so, force
himself to overcome an additional procedural hurdle.

Furthermore, the fact that trial

counsel moved to suppress all Mr. Mallory's statements disproves the State's claim that
he might have had a tactical reason for letting in some of Mr. Mallory's statements, such
that Mr. Mallory would not have to testify. (See Resp. Br., p.20 n.6.) Thus, the State's
arguments regarding the deficient performance prong of the Fifth Amendment claim is
meritless; Mr. Mallory proved that point by a preponderance of the evidence.

7

Since A Properly-Argued Motion To Suppress Was Meritorious, Mr. Mallory Has
Also Proved Prejudice
is
from the fact that a timely motion

so

suppress that evidence would have been

granted. This is true regardless of the other evidence presented at trial. (See Resp.
Br., pp.16-19 (arguing that since there was other evidence of guilt the failure to file the
motion to suppress was not prejudicial) )

As the Court of Appeals explained in

Hernandez, because the evidence in question "should have been suppressed had a
timely motion to suppress been filed by defense counsel, we find that Hernandez has
demonstrated that he was prejudiced by defense counsel's judicially determined
ineffective assistance.

Hernandez v. State, 132 Idaho 352, 358 (Ct. App. 1998). Thus,

the prejudice - the reasonable possibility that the outcome would have been different
had the jury not been presented with inadmissible evidence - is self-evident in these
cases. See id.; see also Hoffman v. State. 153 Idaho 898, 905 (Ct. App. 2012) ("Based
upon this record, a motion to suppress may well have succeed and altered the outcome
of Hoffman's case.") (capitalization altered). After all, the likely outcome of the motion is
generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland4 test. See, e.g., State v. Payne,
146 Idaho 548, 562 (2008) (applying this rule when the motion was unlikely to have
been granted on its merits).
The prejudice is particularly evident in cases such as this, where the State's case

is entirely circumstantial and the credibility of the defense's alternate theory of the case
is at issue.

Here, the apparent inconsistency between Mr. Mallory's improperly-

admitted statements and other of the defense's evidence was used to help discredit the

4

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984).
8

defense's theory of the case. (Supp. Tr, p.1300, L.21 - p.1301, L 14.) Had the jury not
seen that evidence, as in Hernandez, confidence in the jury's verdict is undermined and
there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome would have been different. That this
point was not argued strenuously by the prosecutor (see Resp. Br., pp.19-20) is
irrelevant

The fact that the point was argued, and so, the jury could follow that

argument and discard otherwise-reasonable doubts as a result, shows the reasonable

possibility of a different outcome, had the evidence supporting that argument not been
presented.

Thus, Mr. Mallory proved there is a reasonable possibility of a different

result As such, he proved the prejudice prong of his Fifth Amendment claim.
Since Mr. Mallory proved both deficient performance and prejudice by a
preponderance of the evidence, the district court erred in denying his Fifth Amendment
claim for post-conviction relief. As such, this Court should reverse the judgment and
remand this case for an order granting post-conviction relief on this claim.

11.
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Mallory's Claim That His
Constitutional Rights To Due Process And Equal Protection Were Violated When The
District Court Failed To Timely Rule On His Motion To Appoint A Private Investigator
The State concedes error on the private investigator claim recognizing that the
district court summarily dismissed the claim on a ground for which Mr. Mallory did not
receive the statutorily-required notice and opportunity to respond.

(Resp. Br., p.24

("Mallory is correct in his assertion that he was entitled to additional notice from the
court when it decided to dismiss Claim V on a ground other than that asserted by the
state.").) As such, this case should be remanded so that Mr. Mallory might receive the

9

which he is entitled

See L

§ 19-4906(b) (setting forth

required

This Court Should Not Affirm The Order For Summary Dismissal Of The Private
Investigator Claim In Absence Of Adequate Notice And Opportunity To Respond
Despite its concession, the State argues that this Court can nevertheless affirm
the order summarily dismissing this claim despite the lack of statutorily-required notice if
this Court, looking only at the appellate record, determines this claim is not justiciable in
post-conviction.

(Resp. Br., p.24.) That argument is meritless for two reasons:

the

appellate court is not the proper forum to address that issue for the first time, and even
if this Court does reach that issue, Mr. Mallory's claim is justiciable in post-conviction.

1

The Question Of Justiciability Of A Claim In Post-Conviction Is Not
Properly Resolved For The First Time On Appeal

The notice requirement, both in its express statutory context, as well as it more
general constitutional setting, requires not just that the petitioner be put on notice, but
that he also have an opportunity to be heard in response to that notice. See I.C. §194906(b).

Because of this requirement for an opportunity to respond, the Court of

Appeals has refused to consider issues like this for the first time on appeal. See, e.g.,

Caldwell v. State, _

P.3d _ , 2015 WL 4770639, *4 (Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2015) (pet.

review filed); Wagner v. State, 158 Idaho 582, 585 (Ct. App. 2015)

In Caldwell, for

example, the petitioner claimed his counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and
call an expert witness. Id. The State conceded the merits of that claim, but argued that
the Court of Appeals could affirm the order of summary dismissal because the petitioner
had not presented admissible evidence establishing the substance of the witness's

10

proposed testimony. Id. The Caldwell Court rejected the State's argument, holding that
affirming an order of summary dismissal on a basis the petitioner did not have notice
and an opportunity to respond would be tantamount to a violation of I.C. § 19-4906(b).

Id. at *5. Thus, it is improper for the appellate court to address the issue for the first
time on appeaL Id.; cf Wagner, 158 Idaho at 585.
Per the statute, Mr. Mallory has the right to an opportunity to amend or
supplement his petition with evidence and/or argument demonstrating that his claim is
justiciable in post-conviction.

See I. C. § 19-4906(b ).

However, the appellate courts'

review is limited to the evidence, theories, and arguments presented below. See, e.g.,

State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 670 (2010).

Therefore, it would be difficult and

improper for the appellate court to try to accommodate the requisite opportunity to
amend or supplement the petition with new evidence and argument to address the
alleged deficiency therein.

Therefore, as in Caldwell and Wagner, this Court should

reject the State's invitation to affirm the summary dismissal on a ground for which
Mr. Mallory has not had the requisite notice or the opportunity to respond.

Rather, it

should reverse the summary dismissal order and remand this case so that Mr. Mallory
has the required opportunity to present his supplemented claim to the district court.

Compare Wagner, 158 Idaho at 585.

2.

The Private Investigator Claim Is Justiciable Because It Could Not Have
Been Raised On Direct Appeal In An Exercise Of Due Diligence

The post-conviction statutes expressly provide that a claim of constitutional error,
such as the one Mr. Mallory has raised in the private investigator claim, is justiciable in
post-conviction, provided it could not have been raised earlier in an exercise of due

11

. § 19-1401, see also DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 603-04 (2009)

are separately cognizable in post-

that allegations

, Rossignol v.

152 Idaho 700, 706

App.

12) (same).

such,

private investigator claim, alleging a due process violation, is cognizable in postconviction, provided appellate counsel could not have, in an exercise of due diligence,
raised the issue on direct appeal.
However, an answer to that question is not actually necessary to this case
because Mr. Mallory also alleged that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising
that issue on direct appeal.

( See R., p.113 (claim "d"); see also App. Br., pp.29-31

(arguing the impact of the district court's determination that appellate counsel was not
ineffective for not raising this and other issues on direct appeal).) This means that, if
this Court determines that this cognizable claim should have been raised on direct
appeal, the district court erred by summarily dismissing claim "d." However, if this Court
determines, as did the district court, this cognizable claim could not have been raised on
direct appeal in an exercise of due diligence, the district court erred by summarily
dismissing claim "v." Either way, Mr. Mallory is entitled to relief in this appeal.
This also means that the State's contention - that since the letter from appellate
counsel does not specifically mention the private investigator claim, Mr. Mallory has
failed to show the issue could not have been raised in an exercise of due diligence
(Resp. Br., p.25.) - is irrelevant. The district court actually determined that appellate
counsel was not ineffective for deciding not to raise this,

as well as other

claims, because they were not adequately preserved for appeal at the trial level.
(R., pp.174-77.) That conclusion answers the critical question on this issue: the private

12

investigator claim could not be raised on direct appeal in an exercise of due diligence.
(See R., pp.174-77.) The State has not argued that this conclusion was erroneous.
(See generally Resp. Br.) That means, regardless of what information he actually gave
to Mr. Mallory in that regard, appellate counsel could not have raised this issue in an

exercise of due diligence. 5 Therefore, even if this Court decides to address this issue
for the first time on appeal, Mr. Mallory has presented sufficient evidence to survive
summary dismissal on the private investigator claim.

B.

Mr. Mallory Is Not Required To Allege Actual Prejudice For Post-Conviction
Claims Alleging A Violation Of His Constitutional Rights; The State Bears The
Burden To Prove Harmlessness On Such Claims
Even though this issue should be remanded because Mr. Mallory was not

provided the requisite notice, this Court should address and reject the State's prejudice
argument on the private investigator claim so that the district court might not err on
remand.

See State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 113 (2005) (reaffirming that the

appellate court has authority to decide additional issues to guide the district court on
remand).

Specifically, the State contends that summary dismissal was appropriate

Mr. Mallory maintains, as discussed in depth in the Appellant's Brief at pages 30 and
35-36, that appellate counsel's explanation of why he did not raise issues surrounding
the district court's decision to deny Mr. Mallory's motion for continuance so that he
might locate the potential witness and potential suspect Wes Hardy encompasses the
claim regarding his request for a private investigator. The harm alleged in the private
investigator claim was the reason he had to ask for a continuance: he was unable to
access evidence critical to his defense - namely, Wes Hardy's statements - because of
the erroneous rulings on his motions. (See R., pp.114-15 (Mr. Mallory alleging facts in
his affidavit demonstrating trial counsel's inability to gather information from Wes
Hardy); R., p.62 (affidavit of trial counsel explaining he needed an investigator to gather
that sort of information) (Supp. Tr., p.47, Ls.4-17 (motion for continuance because of an
inability to locate Wes Hardy).) As such, appellate counsel's letter explaining why he
did not raise that issue reinforces the district court's conclusion that appellate counsel
could not have, in an exercise of due diligence, raised the private investigator claim on
direct appeal.
5
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because Mr. Mallory did not allege facts establishing actual prejudice on the private
investigator claim. (Resp. Br., p.26.) That argument is meritless. The Idaho Supreme
Court's decision in DeRushe and the Court of Appeals' decision in Rossignol make it
eminently clear that, if the petitioner chooses to frame a post-conviction claim as
alleging a violation of his constitutional rights, he need only allege facts showing the
violation of that right.

DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 603-04; Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 704.

Once he does so, the burden shifts, and the State must prove that error harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 703-04. The State's argument on
appeal is based on an attempt to shoehorn this issue under the standards for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, an argument which the appellate courts have already
rejected.

See id.; DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 603-04.

Therefore, whether or not

Mr. Mallory alleged actual prejudice is irrelevant; the State, not Mr. Mallory, bears the
burden of alleging and presenting facts to prove the violation of his constitutional right to
due process harmless at an evidentiary hearing. 6
As a result of the State's concession regarding the lack of adequate notice, this
Court should reverse the order summarily denying the private investigator claim and
remand for further proceedings, particularly since Mr. Mallory's allegations on that claim
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to a violation of his constitutional right to due
process.

An evidentiary hearing is merited on the private investigator claim because
Mr. Mallory's allegations about the violation of his right to an investigator to help him
gather the raw materials of his defense raise a genuine issue of material fact which, if
resolved in his favor, would entitle him to relief. (See App. Br., pp.31-35.)
6
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111
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Mallory's Claim That Trial
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To "Fully Litigate" A Challenge To Evidence And
Testimony Regarding The Nature Of The Scratch Marks On His Person

A.

The Fact That Mr. Mallory Alleged Counsel Had Not "Fully Litigated" The Scratch
Mark Evidence Is Not A Valid Basis For Affirming The Order Of Summary
Dismissal
The State does not contest Mr. Mallory's assertion regarding the facts at the

heart of the scratch mark claim - that the scratch marks on his body were not received
until after his wife had passed away and that he pointed out evidence supporting that
assertion to his trial counsel.

(See generally Resp. Br) What it does argue is that

Mr. Mallory's allegations regarding the resulting ineffective assistance counsel

that

trial counsel had not ''fully litigated" that issue - were bare and conclusory, and so,
summary dismissal was appropriate.

(See Resp. Br., p 32 ("[Mr.] Mallory's bare and

conclusory statements did not create a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an
evidentiary hearing.") ) That argument is meritless for several reasons.

1.

Mr. Mallory Was Not Provided Notice Or An Opportunity To Respond To
The Assertion That He Needed To Specifically Allege What Action Trial
Counsel Failed To Undertake

The only reason cited in the State's motion for summary dismissal below in
regard to the scratch mark claim (addressed together with all the claims that trial
counsel was ineffective) was: "While Petitioner presents many hypothetical outcomes,
he fails to provide any factual evidence to support these claims. Further Petitioner fails
to address why this evidence is not included . . . . Petitioner alleges [those] claims
without factual or material support."

(R.. pp.107-08.)
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The State did not argue that

Mr. Mallory failed to identify with sufficient specificity what trial counsel could have done
differently. (See generally R., p.91 (the motion for summary disposition and dismissal);
R., pp.103-09 (the brief in support of motion for summary disposition and dismissal).)
Thus, the State is arguing for this Court to affirm the order of summary dismissal on a
ground for which Mr. Mallory did not have notice, which, as discussed in detail in
Section II, supra, is inappropriate.

2.

The Allegation That Trial Counsel Failed To "Fully Litigate" The Scratch
Mark Claim Is Not "Bare And Conclusory" As It Is Supported By
Admissible Facts In Mr. Mallory's Affidavit

The State contends the scratch mark claim was properly summarily dismissed
because "[Mr.] Mallory's bare and conclusory statements did not create a genuine issue
of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing."

(See Resp. Br., p.32.) That

argument mischaracterizes the "bare and conclusory" standard.
A claim is only "bare and conclusory" if it is "unsubstantiated by any fact"

LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 121 (Ct App. 1997).

As such, when the Court of

Appeals determined that a claim was supported by admissible evidence, it held that
claim was not "bare and conclusory." Arellano v. State, 158 Idaho 708, 712 (Ct. App.
2015). The State has not challenged the facts as alleged by Mr. Mallory in his affidavit:
that the scratch marks were not received until after his wife had passed away and that
he pointed out evidence supporting that assertion to his trial counsel. (See generally
Resp. Br.)
And even if the State had contested those facts, this is the summary dismissal
phase of the proceedings. That means the facts alleged in Mr. Mallory's affidavit are
presumed to be true and are, by themselves, sufficient to overcome a motion for
16

summary dismissal. Compare Baldwin v State, 145 Idaho 148, 155 (2008) ("Baldwin
presents his own affidavit describing his version of [events].
forth facts that would be admissible at trial.

Baldwin's affidavit sets

Thus, because Baldwin's Petition and

Affidavit present facts that would entitle Baldwin to relief, if he were able to prove them
at a hearing, the district court erred when it summarily dismissed the petition.").
Therefore, as there was admissible evidence supporting the allegation in the scratch
mark claim, the State's argument that it is bare and conclusory must fail.

3.

The Allegation That Trial Counsel Did Not "Fully Litigate" The Scratch
Mark Claim Is Sufficiently Specific To Survive Summary Dismissal

The allegation that the scratch mark claim was not "fully litigated" is sufficiently
specific to survive summary dismissal.

The State's argument fails to appreciate the

different levels of proof that exist at the various stages of post-conviction proceedings.
While a petitioner must ultimately prove by a preponderance of the evidence how
counsel erred and how that error prejudiced him, that is the standard at the evidentiary
hearing phase.

See Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933. 936 (Ct. App. 2005) ("At the

evidentiary hearing, Loveland was required to prove his claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence, and the standard for avoiding summary
dismissal ... was no longer applicable.").

The standard at the summary dismissal

stage is lower. See id. A claim is supposed to survive summary dismissal if it presents
a genuine issue of material fact - i.e., if it sets forth a claim which, if the petitioner is
ultimately able to prove at the hearing, would entitle him to relief. See Charboneau v.
State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007).
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As such, a claim does not need to have all the minute details in place to survive
summary dismissal; it must simply present evidence which creates a genuine issue of
material fact.

See State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008); see also LC. § 19-

4903 (a petition for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to the facts within
the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence
supporting its allegations must be attached, or an explanation of why that is not done
must be submitted).

For ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the petitioner

therefore needs to allege deficient performance and support that allegation with specific
facts. See Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444. Whether those specific facts are material "is
determined by its [the fact's] relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties."

Id In cases where "such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be
conducted." Id.
Mr. Mallory's allegation on the scratch mark issue satisfies the standard set forth
in Yakovac. His legal theory is that his attorney did not take all the steps a reasonable
attorney would have to address the scratch mark evidence the State was going to
present (R., p.116) (alleging that evidence "would have contradicted the state's theory
that petitioner had mark's [sic] on his body before the interview that were the result of a
struggle with the victim.").)

In his affidavit, he alleged two relevant facts:

that the

scratch marks on his body were not received until after his wife had passed away and
that he pointed out evidence supporting that assertion to his trial counsel. (R., p.160.)
Those consequential facts have a logical connection with his legal theory. Therefore,
they give rise to a genuine issue of material fact: if he is correct, and the scratch marks
were not present until after his wife had passed away, and his counsel did not take the
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steps a reasonable attorney would to address that evidence, he would be entitled to
relief.

Therefore, even though he did not specifically identify the precise action or

actions trial counsel should have taken. he still alleged a genuine issue of material fact,
as required by Yakovac, which means summary dismissal of this claim is not
appropriate.

B.

The District Court Assessed The Prejudice Arguments On The Scratch Mark
Claim Under An Erroneously-High Standard; Under The Proper Standard,
Mr. Mallory Sufficiently Alleged Prejudice To Survive Summary Dismissal
Along those same lines, the State contends that Mr. Mallory made bare and

conclusory allegations in regard to the prejudice caused by counsel's failure to properly
and fully challenge the scratch mark evidence. (Resp. Br., p.32.) However, the State
misses the more fundamental point as it does not respond to Mr. Mallory's contention
that the district court applied an erroneously-high standard to its analysis of the
prejudice issue in the summary dismissal phase. (See generally Resp. Br.) The issue
of whether there is sufficient allegation of prejudice should first be addressed by the
district court under the proper standard rather than this Court considering the issue for
the first time on appeal. Compare Wagner, 158 Idaho at 585. As such, the order for
summary dismissal of the scratch mark claim should be vacated and that issue
remanded at least so the district court can consider the prejudice arguments under the
proper standard. (See App. Br., pp.37-39 (discussing the proper standard for prejudice
as it relates to the scratch mark issue).)
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At any rate, there were facts before the district court which showed prejudice. 7 In
Mallory asserted the

1

(R.,

marks on

body were not caused

trying to present an alternate perpetrator

was

defense, which necessarily meant he was arguing he was not present or involved at the
critical time.

(See, e.g., R., p.113.)

However, the State, through its witness, Officer

Ward, used the scratch marks to put Mr. Mallory at the scene as evidence he and his
wife were in domestic-violence-type struggle at the critical time. (See Supp. Tr., p.631,
L23 - p.632, L.20.)

This is a particularly important fact given the State's case was

entirely circumstantial.

Thus, the scratch mark evidence played an important role in

tying the State's case together and discrediting the defense theory. Had that evidence
been properly challenged, the confidence in the verdict is undermined - there is a
reasonable possibility the jury would not have convicted Mr. Mallory without that
evidence placing him at the scene at the critical time. Thus, Mr. Mallory has made a
sufficient showing of prejudice to survive summary dismissal, particularly because at

The State contends that facts must be alleged within the context of a particular claim
and cannot be cross-applied to other claims. ( See Resp. Br., pp.26-27 ("Mallory
attempts to remedy the deficiencies in his allegations in support of Claim V by relying on
allegations he made in support of other claims in his petition .... he cannot use those
claims, which were dismissed, to show he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
Claim V.") This argument is frivolous, as the practical result would only serve to waste
judicial resources. The State's argument might initially make more sense in the postconviction context, where a petitioner is allowed to allege facts within the petition itself.
See, e.g., Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that, when a
petitioner verifies his petition, it has the effect of an affidavit vis-a-vis the facts discussed
therein). However, the State's argument fails to appreciate the distinction between facts
and legal arguments in the post-conviction context. See Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444.
As Yakovac explained, the petitioner alleges facts which must then connect to the legal
theories. Id. Thus, while a particular legal theory might be dismissed because the facts
do not connect to that theory such that they would create a genuine issue of material
fact, the facts themselves remain intact and can impact on other valid claims. Id. Thus,
the State's contention that Mr. Mallory cannot cross-apply the facts between his various
claims is meritless and should be rejected.
7
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this stage in the proceedings, the inferences are supposed to be liberally construed in
his favor as he is the non-moving party. See, e.g., Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792.
Since Mr. Mallory made sufficient allegations and presented sufficient evidence

to establish a genuine issue of material fact on the scratch mark claim, this Court should
reverse the district court's order summarily dismissing that claim.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Mallory respectfully requests that this Court reverse the orders denying and
summarily dismissing his claims for post-conviction relief and remand this case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 25 th day of September, 2015.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

21

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY
that on this
day
September, 20
copy
the foregoing APPELLANT'S
BRI
U.S. Mail, addressed
a copy thereof in
GARY WAYNE MALLORY
INMATE# 97013
ICIO
381 W HOSPITAL DRIVE
OROFINO ID 83544
JAY GASKILL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
GREGORY HURN
KWATE LAW OFFICES PLLC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010

Administrative Assistant
BRD/eas

22

